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1. Introduction 
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) reports that malaria, a parasitic 
disease transmitted by mosquitoes, causes over 300 million episodes of “acute 
illness” and more than one million deaths annually.1 Most of the deaths occur in 
poor countries of the tropics, and about 90 percent occur in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Infants and children account for most of the mortality from malaria; the disease is 
thought to account for one of every five child deaths in the world.2 
Even where people survive malaria, the disease causes numerous health and 
cognitive problems. It is associated with maternal anemia during pregnancy, with 
low birth weight for babies, and it is a major cause of childhood anemia. Severe 
disease episodes (i.e., “cerebral” malaria) have been shown to cause severe long-
term physical and neurological disability. There is no clear evidence on the 
cognitive impact of malaria on individuals who contract less severe cases of the 
disease, although there are reasons to suspect non-trivial effects on learning 
among schoolchildren.3 
There is no effective vaccine or inoculation to prevent malaria. However, the 
disease can be treated at relatively low cost (at least in its milder forms) with 
drugs or even simple measures to reduce the severity of symptoms. Prevention 
measures are also relatively inexpensive. For example, mosquito nets impregnated 
with insecticides, available for $5-$10 each (or less), can significantly reduce 
exposure to mosquitoes and thereby limit malaria morbidity and mortality.4 But 
these measures may require careful implementation and recurring maintenance, 
which may not be feasible for many affected families. 
At present, many of the world’s poor countries face high rates of malaria 
endemism. By one estimate, about 40 percent of the world’s population lives in 
areas where malaria is endemic, and these people are on average very poor. 
According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), “Malaria is truly a 
disease of poverty. It afflicts primarily the poor, who tend to live in malaria-prone 
areas in dwellings that offer few, if any, barriers against mosquitoes” (UNICEF 
2005). Sachs and Malaney (2002) argue that “[a]s a general rule of thumb, where 
malaria prospers most, human societies have prospered least…. The extent of the 
correlation suggests that malaria and poverty are intimately related.”  
                                                 
1 Reported by WHO on the “Roll Back Malaria” program website at:  
http://mosquito.who.int/cmc_upload/0/000/015/372/RBMInfosheet_1.htm, January 30, 2005. 
2 Reported by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 
http://www.unicef.org/health/index_malaria.html, accessed June 10, 2005. 
3 A useful survey is Holding and Snow (2001). 
4 UNICEF reports that the use of such bednets can reduce child mortality from malaria by 20 
percent (http://www.unicef.org/health/index_malaria.html, accessed June 10, 2005).  
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The causality of this relationship is complicated, however. Does malaria cause 
poverty? Or does poverty cause malaria? Both channels of causation seem 
reasonable. It is also possible, as noted by Sachs and Malaney (2002), that the 
correlation could be spurious, caused perhaps by some other direct connection 
between climate and geography with growth rates or income levels. Resolving 
these causality issues has been difficult for researchers trying to assess the 
economic impact of malaria. 
In spite of the difficulties involved, two widely publicized papers have found 
that malaria appears to slow economic growth in poor countries. Both papers use 
cross-country regression techniques and attempt to use instruments or controls to 
address the obvious causality problems. McCarthy, Wolf, and Wu (1999) find that 
malaria prevalence is negatively related to growth of per capita income. In turn, 
they find that malaria morbidity is linked to climatic differences across countries. 
The magnitude of malaria’s effect on growth is substantial: they find that Sub-
Saharan African countries experience a reduction in income growth of 0.55 
percent annually because of malaria. Using a relatively similar methodology, 
Gallup and Sachs (2000) find that countries with “intensive” malaria experience a 
reduction in per capita income growth of 1.3% annually. They suggest that, 
everything else being equal, a country experiencing intensive malaria would have 
its long-term level of income per capita reduced by one-third, compared with the 
same country in the absence of malaria.5  
Based on this analysis, Sachs and other authors have suggested increasing 
current spending on malaria control by more than an order of magnitude. Global 
spending on malaria prevention and control is currently around $100-200 million 
annually.6 But based in large part on his estimates of the economic impacts of the 
disease, Sachs (2005b) has estimated that $2-3 billion in annual spending would 
be needed to control the disease effectively in Africa alone. These larger sums are 
clearly within the capacity of the international community, but they would 
represent a substantial fraction of total aid disbursements by rich countries.7 As a 
result, the increases would either require significant reallocation of existing aid 
portfolios or increases in the total quantities of foreign assistance given by rich 
countries.  
To the extent that such increases in expenditure are justified by appealing to 
the likely impact on income levels and growth rates in malarial countries, it is 
useful to look further at the evidence for malaria’s impact on income levels.  
                                                 
5 These numbers passed from academic research into policy; in the Abuja Declaration of 2000 40 
African heads of state and governments signed on to a major commitment to fight malaria, citing 
these numbers as one major justification. 
6 Sachs and Malaney (2002) use the lower estimate. 
7 In 2002, OECD countries gave $58.3 billion in foreign assistance of all kinds. 
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In the empirical literature, Acemoglu and Johnson (2006) offer a far more 
skeptical view of the growth effects of disease, based on an instrumental variables 
approach. They are joined in this skepticism by Weil (2006) and Cutler, Fung, 
Kremer and Singhal (2007). Some other authors (Bleakley 2007, Lucas 2005), 
however, find evidence that malaria eradication campaigns resulted – after very 
long time lags – in quantitatively significant impacts on health, fertility, and 
income. Some difficulties with the empirical literature include the paucity of 
reliable data and the inherent difficulty of identification. 
To provide a different perspective on the issue, we find it useful to present a 
formal model of malaria in a dynamic setting. Our paper is somewhat related to 
work by Chakraborty, Papageorgiou, and Pérez Sebastiàn (2007) that looks at an 
overlapping generation economy with malaria.8 But because their analysis is 
based on a two-period model, quantitative results on the magnitude of disease 
impacts are hard to interpret.  
Our paper brings an explicit dynamic general equilibrium framework to the 
question of malaria’s impacts. We incorporate an epidemiological model of 
disease (following Gersovitz and Hammer 2004, 2005 or Philipson 2000), with a 
standard general equilibrium framework. Using a calibrated version of the model, 
we examine the impact of malaria on steady-state economic outcomes in the 
absence of prevention and control measures. We also model the impact of costly 
prevention measures, including measures that are less than fully effective. 
 
2. Background 
Malaria is an ancient disease, although its exact origins and evolutionary 
history are unclear. It was described in China some five thousand years ago. It is 
thought to have originated in Africa and to have spread subsequently into Asia 
and the Mediterranean. Greek writers recognized the disease and its symptoms, 
and one source notes that malaria was responsible for the decline of city-state 
populations and depopulation of rural areas.9 The disease appears to have 
migrated to the New World following the Columbian exchange, and to this day, 
fewer different strains of malaria are found in the Americas than in Africa and 
Asia. Recent research suggests that the origins and spread of the disease in the 
Old World paralleled the spread of sedentary agriculture (Tishkoff et al., 2001).10 
                                                 
8 An earlier version of this paper is circulated as Papageorgiou, Chakraborty, and Pérez Sebastiàn 
(2005); this covers similar ground using a closely related model, but with an endowment economy 
that offers little insight into the interaction between income and disease. 
9 See http://www.cdc.gov/malaria/history (cited June 2005). 
10 See also McNeill (1976), pp. 219-221. 
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Historically, malaria was endemic in most regions of the world. The morbidity 
and mortality burden of malaria differ from country to country, in part because the 
prevalence of the disease (and the conditions that give rise to the disease) differ 
substantially across regions. Hamoudi and Sachs (1999) report that historically, 
malaria was found as far north as 64° N latitude (farther north than Stockholm or 
Moscow) and as far south as 32° S.  
 
2.1 Disease biology and ecology 
Malaria is a disease caused by a family of macroparasites that infect humans. 
There are in fact four species of Plasmodium parasites that cause malaria in 
people. These four species have similar life cycles; all are transmitted to humans 
by a mosquito vector (various species of Anopheles mosquitoes) and live a portion 
of their life cycle in the mosquito host.  
A person is infected with malaria when he or she is bitten by an infected 
mosquito, which passes the Plasmodium parasite into the person’s bloodstream in 
a form known as a sporozoite. The parasites lead a complex life cycle inside the 
human host, living at various stages in liver cells and red blood cells. From time 
to time, they cycle through stages in which they destroy numerous red blood cells. 
It is at this stage that the disease generates its most severe symptoms in infected 
people. Eventually, the parasites become gametocytes which are in turn ingested 
by mosquitoes that bite the human host. Inside the mosquito, the gametocytes 
mature, reproduce sexually, and migrate into the mosquito’s salivary glands, at 
which stage the life cycle is repeated.11 For some species of Plasmodium, the 
parasites may persist in the liver for months or years, resulting in chronic and 
recurring eruptions of merozoites that correspond to episodes of fever and 
sickness. 
The disease varies with the infecting species of Plasmodium and with the 
individual’s prior health and immune status. Typically, it causes fever and chills, 
along with headaches, vomiting, and diarrhea. It may also cause long-term 
anemia, liver damage, and neurological damage. The most dangerous species, P. 
falciparum, can cause cerebral malaria, a frequently fatal condition involving the 
brain and central nervous system. Those who survive cerebral malaria may 
experience lasting brain damage.  
The prevalence of the disease varies across the globe, largely due to 
differences in the human exposure to Anopheles mosquito bites. Some of this 
variation is geographic and climatic: these mosquitoes are not found in areas of 
                                                 
11 The life cycle is described and illustrated at: http://www.dpd.cdc.gov/dpdx/HTML/Malaria.htm 
(viewed June 2005). 
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intense cold or in deserts (Sachs and Malaney 2002). Human exposures are also 
reduced in areas where mosquitoes spend winter months as eggs or in dormant 
stages of their life cycle. Exposures may also be reduced in areas where people 
spend significant fractions of their time indoors in enclosed or screened buildings, 
or where people are dressed in ways that will reduce exposure. 
The ecological adaptation of different mosquito species is also important. 
Although many species of Anopheles mosquitoes are capable of transmitting the 
Plasmodium organisms, transmission occurs only when a mosquito first bites an 
infected human and then subsequently bites another (uninfected) human. Some 
species of mosquitoes, however, prefer not to feed on humans (although they will 
do so if other food sources are not available). Others are anthropophilic; i.e., they 
prefer to feed on humans. Anthropophilic mosquitoes are obviously more likely to 
transmit malaria from individual to individual. Thus, areas where anthropophilic 
mosquitoes are prevalent are likely to face more acute malaria burdens.  
McNeill (1976) notes that the geographic distribution of mosquito species is 
largely due to chance, from the perspective of humans. The distribution depends 
on highly local ecological differences (trace minerals in the water, salinity of 
water, types of habitat, etc.). Thus, pure ecological chance had large effects on the 
relative prevalence of different mosquito species, across the globe, and hence on 
the relative prevalence of malaria. McNeill notes that “the mosquito species 
which is Europe’s most efficient vector of malaria… prefers to feed on cattle. If 
enough alternate sources of blood are available to them, these mosquitoes will 
eschew potential human hosts and thus interrupt the chain of infection, since 
cattle do not suffer from malaria” (p. 117). 
In fact, one of the apparent reasons for the extensive malaria burden in sub-
Saharan Africa is the prevalence of two species of highly anthropophilic species 
of Anopheles mosquitoes: An. gambiae and An. funestus. These two species 
together inhabit much of the humid zone of Africa, and only the northern and 
southern extremities of the continent are free from these strongly anthropophilic 
species.12 This clearly plays a significant role in accounting for malaria’s impact 
in the region, although poverty may also play an important part (Sachs and 
Malaney 2002). 
It is true that the types of mosquito prevalent in different regions are, in an 
ecological sense, related to human impacts on the landscape. It is also true, 
however, that the distribution of mosquito species across the landscape is largely 
exogenous in the short run. For the purposes of this paper, we will treat mosquito 
habitats as an exogenous characteristic of a place.  
                                                 
12 The distribution of Anopheles species around the globe is shown at: 
http://www.cdc.gov/malaria/biology/mosquito/map.htm.  
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2.2 Economic impact of malaria  
As noted above, malaria causes morbidity and mortality with obvious 
economic consequences. Sachs and Malaney (2002) survey a number of the 
impacts of malaria. The direct individual economic impacts of the disease include 
the value of lives lost, the value of time lost to sickness, and the expenditures on 
medical care, treatment, and prevention. Direct social costs include government 
expenditures on malaria control and prevention. The indirect costs may be greater 
still. These include changes in human settlement and labor patterns induced by the 
disease (e.g., changes in the locations where people live or farm). Indirect costs 
also include the consequences of the disease on fertility, demography, and human 
capital investments; on trade patterns and investment; and potentially on 
managerial quality and technology adoption. (For example, skilled managers may 
prefer not to work in malarial regions, resulting in reduced productivity levels.)13  
Impacts of malaria on fertility and human capital decisions are difficult to 
document, since all are related to income levels. The same is true of malaria’s 
impacts on trade and investment and many other variables that are correlated with 
income levels.  
 
3. The Base Model 
 
To consider the impact of malaria on income levels, we need a model 
environment in which both channels of causation are present: in other words, 
malaria can affect income and/or productivity, and simultaneously, income and/or 
productivity can affect the prevalence of the disease. We also need to use a model 
in which it is possible to consider the behavioral responses that individuals may 
take to reduce the short-term and dynamic impact of the disease. Finally, we need 
a model in which it is possible to consider alternative policies for controlling 
malaria. 
We present here the simplest possible model that has all the necessary features 
for addressing the link between income and disease prevalence. It tracks the 
dynamics of the spread of malaria, has endogenous production and prices, factors 
                                                 
13 At an even more remote level, it might be possible to view human biological adaptations to 
malaria as part of the indirect cost. Thus, sickle cell traits, found in some individuals of African 
descent, are damaging and costly in their own right. Medical literature strongly suggests that the 
sickle cell trait confers some resistance to malaria and is thus an adaptive evolutionary response to 
the disease. Arguably, then, we could count the costs of sickle cell anemia as one of the indirect 
costs of malaria. 
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in idiosyncratic shocks – both from malaria and other sources – and takes into 
account the differential mortality for sick and disease-free people. There are no 
insurance markets, but households can accumulate assets to self-insure against 
persistent idiosyncratic shocks. Essentially, this is a Huggett (1996) economy with 
epidemiological features embedded. The epidemiological aspects of the model are 
similar to those presented by Philipson (2000), and we borrow from his analysis 
of “rational epidemics.”  
 
3.1 Model environment 
The model environment has many individuals, born identical. New individuals 
are born each period. Some individuals die in each period, with mortality rates 
dependent on infection rates. Individuals are exposed to the disease in each 
period; some fall sick. The probability that an individual will become sick is 
positively related to the fraction of individuals in the population who are already 
sick, so infection rates are endogenous to the model. Sick individuals face 
heightened probabilities of death and lower labor productivity. To avoid 
population explosions or collapses, we model fertility rates as consistent with a 
constant population level. 
Individuals are born healthy. They have zero initial asset holdings, but they 
accumulate assets through their lives. Assets can be rented to a representative firm 
in a perfectly competitive market for current-period production. However, there is 
no credit market, nor is there any insurance market. Therefore, individuals in the 
economy will use precautionary savings to protect themselves from idiosyncratic 
shocks. Assets vanish when people die.14 
Note that some characteristics of this asset make it similar to human capital: 
people are born with no positive endowment; they cannot hold negative amounts; 
and their holdings disappear upon death. It is also the only savings technology in 
a rudimentary economy. In other respects, however, the asset is perhaps more like 
physical capital: it is measured in the same units as output and consumption, and 
thus it can be used to smooth consumption or to make “lumpy’ purchases. In these 
respects, the asset is more analogous to physical capital than to human capital. 
As in Philipson (2000), individuals may, at any point during their lives, make 
a lumpy purchase of a preventive good that will confer future protection from 
malaria. This lifetime prophylaxis requires a one-time expenditure of q units of 
consumption good. We think of this as the present value of a lifetime expenditure 
                                                 
14 This assumption effectively serves as a type of depreciation in the economy. We could equally 
well allow for assets to be redistributed to the new generation. The qualitative results of the model 
would not change significantly. 
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stream on bednets, drugs, and other preventive goods. Alternatively, if an 
effective vaccine were to become available for malaria, we could model this as 
the cost of the vaccine. Note that this is an indivisible purchase, and we initially 
model it as being totally and perfectly effective. In other words, once an 
individual has purchased the prophylaxis, he or she does not subsequently 
contract malaria, and there is no need for future spending. Subsequently, we will 
relax the assumption of perfect efficacy. In fact, our quantitative results, reported 
below, show that that when the preventive goods offer imperfect protection, there 
are large quantitative impacts on uptake, infection rates, and economic outcomes. 
 
3.2 Preferences and endowments 
Preferences for any household i are given by the period utility function:  
 ( ) ( )
1
;
1
it it
it it
s c c
u c s
ργ
ρ
−−⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦= −   
with lifetime utility given by: , where sit reflects a utility cost of 
being sick, such that 
(
0
;t it it
t
u c sβ∞
=
∑ )
{ },1 , 0 1its s s∈ ≤ ≤ . A value of 1its = corresponds to health, 
and a value of its s= corresponds to sickness. The parameter γ is a scalar that will 
determine the utility level of subsistence, and it will be calibrated below to give a 
plausible value for the “value of life” for people in the model economy.  
Given their health status, households care only about consumption. They also 
face a subsistence consumption requirement, c . This may be important in 
determining the affordability of disease prevention measures for different 
households.  
Individuals are endowed with one unit of labor time in each period, which 
they supply inelastically to the labor market. Their effective labor units depend on 
health status, , and its itπ , which is an indicator of labor efficiency. This efficiency 
parameter is subject to idiosyncratic shocks and evolves according to a Markov 
process. Healthy individuals supply one raw unit of labor; if they are sick, 
however, their raw labor supply is reduced to h . Effective labor units are 
determined by the raw labor supply and the idiosyncratic shock, so that:  
 
  
 
, if 
, if 1
it it
it
it it
h s s
h
s
π
π
⎧ == ⎨ =⎩
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.  
Individuals have the capacity to influence their health status through the 
decision of whether or not to purchase prophylaxis against malaria. We define q 
to be a basket of consumption goods necessary to achieve permanent disease 
protection (described in more detail below), and tp is individual i’s decision to 
purchase q. This choice is a binary choice, such that { }0,1itp ∈ .  
Given this setup, the individual’s period budget constraint is given by: 
  
 , 1it i t it t it it t itc k p q w h r kπ++ + ≤ +   
where denotes accumulated assets, is the return to capital, and is the 
wage. 
0itk > tr tw
 
3.3 Technology 
 
The technology side of our model economy is characterized by an aggregate 
technology with constant returns to scale. Individual effective labor units 
aggregate to t it
i
L h itπ=∑ , and individual asset holdings aggregate to the physical 
capital stock . These are used to produce output  according to the 
Cobb-Douglas production function: 
t
i
K =∑ itk tY
 1t t tY K L
α α−= .  
Factor prices then correspond to the marginal products of the factors. Thus, we 
assume that there is a perfect rental market for factors in this economy, with only 
spot markets available. Firms earn zero profits, and since there are no fixed costs, 
we can treat the economy as having a single cost-minimizing aggregate firm 
which rents capital and labor from the population and earns zero profits in 
equilibrium.  
3.4 Population dynamics  
In such an environment, population dynamics become important. We need to 
specify birth and mortality rates, which are differentiated across populations of 
sick and healthy people. We also need to model the risk of infection. Let and hd
sd be the death rates of healthy and sick people, respectively. Let their fertility 
rate be f .  
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Defining N as the total population, we denote S as the proportion of sick 
people: 
1, if  
, where 
0,otherwise 
i
ii
i
S s s
S S
N
=⎧= = ⎨⎩
∑
. 
 
Trivially, the proportion of healthy people in the economy can be written as 
1H S= − . Let V be the proportion of people who have purchased prophylaxis. 
This is effectively a stock variable. In each period, there are also people 
purchasing prophylaxis; this fraction is given by:  
i
i
p
P
N
=
∑
. 
This group can in turn be divided into those who purchase when healthy and 
those who purchase when already sick. The healthy purchasers are given by:  
i
i H
h
p
P
H
∈=
∑
, 
while those purchasing q when already sick are given by:  
 
i
i S
s
p
P
S
∈=
∑
. 
 
Define the indicator variable such that it takes a value of unity for 
individuals who have ever purchased protection and zero for all others. Then the 
fraction of individuals who are protected from disease is given by: 
iv
i
i
v
V
N
=
∑
. 
Note that these individuals may be sick or healthy at the time when they 
purchase protection. Thus, we have 
i i
i
s
v S
V
N
=
∑
 and 
( )1i i
i
h
v S
V
N
−
=
∑
. In 
equilibrium, people who are sick will not choose to purchase protection, since it 
will not cure them of the disease. (We could model this differently, without any 
substantive change in the results.)  
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3.5 Laws of motion 
Armed with this notation, we can write the laws of motion for different groups 
in the economy as follows: 
For population, the net increment to population comes from deaths of sick and 
healthy people and from the fertility of sick and healthy people. Note that we do 
not treat men and women separately, nor do we model fertility rates as age-
dependent, so that all individuals in the model economy can bear children. Thus: 
 
 .s hN N d S d H fN′ = − − +   
The proportion S of sick people depends on births, deaths, and infection. Let I 
be the infection rate for healthy people who have not purchased prophylaxis. 
Then:  
 
 
( )( )1 1s
s h
N S d S IH V d
S
N d S d H fN
− + − − h⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦′ = − − +   
The proportion of people who are protected from disease evolves according to 
the law of motion  
 
( ) ( )1 1
.s s h h h h s s
s h
N V d V d V P H d P S d
V
N d S d H fN
− − + − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦′ = − − +   
We need still to characterize the infection rate I that applies for healthy people 
who have not purchased prophylaxis. Following Philipson (2000), we assume that 
the probability of contracting an infection depends on the proportion of people 
already infected and also on the inherent ecology of the disease. Thus, we make 
use of a formulation in which the infection rate itself evolves according: 
 Si Z
N
μ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠   
where S
N
⎛⎜⎝ ⎠
⎞⎟  is the fraction of the population that is currently sick, Z is an index of 
malaria ecology, and μ is a parameter. This function has important properties. If 
either the population is fully healthy or the malaria ecology is zero, the next 
period’s infection rate will be zero: this is a steady state. It is also the case that if 
both the infection rate and the ecology are at 1, this is another steady state. Note 
that our treatment of infection differs slightly from that of Philipson, whose 
“hazard rate” for infection combines both the natural rate of infection and the 
behavioral response. We define i here to be the probability that an unprotected 
individual will become infected in the next period; i.e., conditional on the 
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individual not purchasing protection. Philipson’s hazard rate, by contrast, gives an 
unconditional probability.  
 
Finally, defining , and dropping time subscripts, the law of motion 
for the aggregate capital stock is given by 
t
i
C =∑ itc
s s hK K Y C PqN d K d Kh′ = + − − − − , 
where sK  and  are respectively the aggregate capital held by the sick and the 
healthy. Note that the distribution of capital across individuals is non-degenerate. 
Indeed, good and bad luck with idiosyncratic shocks and health determine how 
much an individual accumulates. There is no borrowing or lending, nor is there 
insurance, so capital acts as a “rainy day fund” for individuals in the economy.  
hK
 
3.6 Equilibrium 
 
We will define an equilibrium in this economy using a recursive approach. An 
equilibrium will consist of functions of the state variables for the economy and for 
the individuals: 
 
• Functions for prices and wages; 
• Functions for individual consumption, asset holdings, labor supply, and 
disease protection decisions; 
• Distributions of health status and capital across individuals. 
• Functions for the aggregate labor and aggregate capital employed in 
production, and the aggregate output produced; 
• Laws of motions for each type’s endogenous state 
 
such that individuals of each type maximize utility subject to budget constraints, 
across states; the representative firm maximizes profits, subject to zero profits; 
factor markets and goods markets clear; the distributions of health status and 
capital are invariant; and the individual functions are consistent with the 
aggregate laws of motion for the economy. 
Characterizing and solving for the equilibrium of this economy can be 
complicated. Note that disease dynamics imply that this economy will display 
multiple steady states. To see this, observe that with S = 0, there will be a steady 
state regardless of how many people purchase prophylaxis. In general, the 
existence of an interior steady state (0 < S <1) will depend on the cost of the 
protective goods, q, relative to the subsistence consumption requirement and the 
distribution of capital per person in the economy. With higher levels of capital, 
the economy can jump from one in which prophylaxis is generally unprofitable to 
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one in which it is universal. Some poor economies, however, will never escape 
the high-disease trap. By contrast, other economies will start with sufficiently 
high levels of capital per worker that they will defeat the malaria burden.  
The steady states here differ a little from those of standard Solow models. 
Like other models of this type, the steady state is determined as the point at which 
asset accumulation (initial asset endowments of the newly born plus savings from 
those who are alive) exactly offsets the loss of capital that occurs when 
individuals die. Our models display multiple steady states, because of the disease 
dynamics involved. 
We view the multiplicity of steady states in the model as a substantively 
useful one for thinking about why some countries have been able to leave behind 
the problems of malaria, while other countries – even those with similar climate 
and geography – remain caught in a trap characterized by low productivity and 
high infection. For example, Singapore has effectively eliminated malaria 
infection, whereas Congo – a country that is reported to have a comparable 
malaria ecology – suffers from vastly higher rates of infection. Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka have roughly comparable malaria ecologies (Sachs et al. 2004), and 
income per capita in Sri Lanka is almost double the level in Pakistan (Heston et 
al. 2002), but Sri Lanka has a reported malaria prevalence rate that is 20 times 
that of Pakistan (Asian Development Bank 2005). 
In our model, multiplicity allows for countries at similar income levels and 
with similar malaria ecologies to have different equilibrium levels of malaria 
prevalence, prevention, and other variables. 
Finally, we note that the model economy – as is typical of models with 
infectious disease – is characterized by an important externality related to the 
transmission of disease. An individual contemplating the decision of whether or 
not to purchase prevention does not take into account the potential impact of her 
decision on the infection rates faced by others. As a result, private actors are 
likely to purchase inefficiently low levels of the preventive good. Thus, there may 
be a role for the government to subsidize the bundle of preventive goods.  
 
 
 
4. Calibration 
We are interested in a set of quantitative experiments in which we assess the 
effects on aggregate output of various (exogenous) changes that will affect both 
malaria prevalence and economic variables of interest. The first such experiment 
is to ask simply how large an effect malaria can have in an economy where no 
protective measures are available; in other words, where there is no behavioral 
response that is effective in reducing the burden of malaria. Arguably, this is a 
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useful framework for thinking about the impact of the disease in some of the most 
severely affected environments, where neither spraying nor chemoprophylaxis nor 
drug treatments are effectively able to reduce the proportion of people suffering 
from the disease.  
Specifically, the experiment we conduct is to calibrate the model to a set of 
benchmark parameters and then to suppose that the cost of a preventive bundle of 
goods, represented by q, is prohibitive.  
To carry out this and our subsequent experiments, we need to select values for 
the parameters of the model. A number of the parameters we take from the 
literature, and others we choose to match observations for a stylized poor malarial 
country. For all the important parameters of the model, we perform robustness 
checks, as described below. 
The parameters for preferences we take to be standard. The discount factor β  
we set to 0.95, assuming annual frequency, and we set the risk aversion parameter 
ρ  = 1. The disutility of sickness is measured by the parameter s , which we set 
equal to 1.0 in the benchmark economy, implying no disutility. We also report 
robustness checks using a value of 0.9, which is consistent with estimates of 
“disability weights” such as those reported by Murray and Lopez (1996). The 
change is not quantitatively important in our model. 
Since malaria increases the probability of death in our model, we also need to 
consider the value that people associate with living as opposed to dying. For this 
we draw on estimates from the U.S. that estimate the statistical value of a life at 
approximately $4 million to $9 million (Viscusi and Aldy 2003). Taking $7 
million as a reasonable middle number, we compute that this is approximately 
11.3 times lifetime consumption in the U.S. As a result, we set the subjective 
value placed on living at 11.3 times annual consumption in the benchmark 
economy, which pins down a value of γ = 11.3. This number is also subjected to 
some robustness checks, which are reported below.  
 We use a value of 0.9 for the labor efficiency units of a person infected with 
malaria. This reflects a number of micro studies in the literature and is broadly 
consistent with Bleakley’s work (2003) looking at malaria in the U.S. South. The 
subsistence constraint is set to zero in the benchmark economy.  
Individuals also face idiosyncratic shocks independent of the risk of 
contracting malaria. We need to specify both the transition matrix for shocks and 
the magnitude of the shocks. In the experiments reported here, the magnitude of 
the shocks is taken to be 0.224 (following Domeij and Heathcote 2004), while the 
transition matrix is set to:  
 
.900 .100
.100 .900
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . 
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We use a capital share on the aggregate production technology of 0.36, in 
keeping with standard practice in the literature.  
This leaves fertility rates and death rates for healthy and sick people, plus the 
crucial parameters relating to the cost of preventive goods and the infection rate. 
Death rates are taken to be 0.075 for sick people (i.e., those infected with 
malaria) and 0.015 for healthy people. It is difficult to know which observations 
in the data to use for calibrating these parameters, but we believe the results to be 
quite robust to the death rates. To simplify the analysis, we set the fertility rate  
such that population will be stable in equilibrium. In other words, we allow the 
fertility rate to adjust to offset the deaths of sick and healthy people. 
The cost of prophylaxis is another critical parameter for the model. Chima et 
al. (2003) provide a good summary of the literature on the costs of prevention and 
treatment of malaria in Africa. These numbers are hard to interpret, because (a) 
the figures given are often averages that include people who did not purchase 
preventive goods; (b) the goods on which people are spending money are not in 
fact effective in prevention (e.g., mosquito coils); and (c) the expenditure on 
bednets, screens, and mosquito coils is only partly intended to reduce malaria 
incidence, while also serving the purpose of reducing the annoyance of mosquito 
bites. Nevertheless, some reasonable numbers come out: bednets cost between $5 
and $10 per person and last perhaps five years under reasonable use. At an 
interest rate of 0.05, the present value of a lifetime stream of bednet purchases at 
$5 is about $20-$25 per person, which assuming per capita income of about $500 
could be modeled as a one-time fixed cost of 4-5% of annual per capita income. 
At $10 per bednet, obviously, the number rises to 8-10% of per capita income. (At 
an interest rate of 0.10, this falls back to 5%.) The estimates of eventual 
vaccination costs are not much different in NPV terms, with estimates of $20-
$60.15 Thus, it seems that realistic values for this cost might range from 0.05 to 
0.10 of annual income. 
Finally, we have the parameters Z and μ for the infection rate process. Using 
the malaria ecology index of Sachs et al. (2004), we re-scale to define the index 
on the interval [0,1] and then find a value of 0.7 for a “typical” malarial country. 
In the data, this corresponds roughly to the level prevalent in Cambodia, 
Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, or Congo. For that matter, it is also the malaria 
ecology prevalent in Singapore, a country with essentially no malaria. Thus, the 
malaria ecology value that we choose is consistent in the real world with both 
malarial countries and malaria-free countries. 
                                                 
15 At present, of course, no effective vaccine is available. 
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The parameter μ gives the elasticity of next period’s infection rate with 
respect to the malaria ecology. We can estimate this by regressing infection rates 
on malaria ecology. A value of 0.122 was obtained from this regression.  
 
 
5. Experiments and Results  
Using the calibrated model, we conducted a number of experiments that we 
report below. The first experiment considers an economy in which protection 
from malaria is not possible. We compare its healthy and unhealthy steady states. 
The second experiment considers the same question for an economy in which 
malaria protection is available, though costly. We carry out this experiment for a 
large range of possible costs. Finally, we repeat the second experiment for a range 
of possible parameter values, to assess the robustness of our results. 
 
Experiment 1: 
The first experiment that we consider is one in which we compare the 
benchmark economy in two steady states, one of which has everyone healthy and 
the other of which has essentially all people sick. A simple way to arrive at these 
steady states is to set the cost of the preventative good at a very high level, so that 
it is effectively unavailable. The two steady states can be found by initializing the 
economy with all sick people or all healthy people. Both steady states are feasible, 
and initial conditions in the model economy will determine which one pertains. 
An economy that begins poor and sick will tend to say poor and sick, while one 
that starts with better health or higher initial assets will end up at a better steady 
state.  
The comparison of these two steady states offers an insight into the maximum 
possible impact of the disease within the model economy. In effect, we are 
examining the case in which there is no behavioral response to malaria. This 
provides a kind of upper bound of the disease’s impact, within the model.  
Table 1 shows the results of this experiment. The impact of the disease in this 
case is large. The steady state with widespread malaria infection has an income 
per capita that is 43 percent lower than that in the healthy steady state. Per capita 
consumption is even lower, with a 49 percent reduction from the healthy steady 
state. The proximate cause of the reduction is that steady state asset holdings are 
only 25 percent of the value in the healthy steady state. This reflects the shorter 
average lifespans of people in the malarial steady state: they do not live as long as 
those in the healthy steady state, nor do they expect to live as long, and they are 
poorer while alive. As a result, they save at a lower rate and accumulate assets 
over a shorter period. Figure 1 shows the distributions of asset holdings for the 
healthy steady state and the malarial steady state, and the impact of the disease is 
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evident. It is this effect, rather than the direct impact of the disease on effective 
labor units, that has the greatest impact.  
One way to think about this experiment is to view it as the benefits to the 
model economy of escaping from its malarial steady state and moving to its 
healthy steady state. Are there substantial impacts on income, as Sachs seems to 
suggest? Can we identify important ex post differences between the two 
economies?  
The answer here is that there is a large difference in steady-state incomes 
between the two economies. The difference is not sufficient to explain why 
malarial countries are poor and non-malarial countries are rich, but it is true that 
in the model economy, eradication of malaria would lead approximately to a 
doubling of per capita income. This is a large impact. Note that the macro impacts 
of the response are far greater than the micro impacts; although individuals lose 
only 10 percent of their labor productivity to the disease, the lower asset 
accumulation leads to an amplification mechanism through which the disease 
impacts are multiplied.  
 
 
Experiment 2: 
In the second experiment, we ask again about the impact of a single economy 
moving between its “healthy” steady state and its “sick” steady state. In contrast 
to the first experiment, however, we assume that an effective preventive good is 
available, though costly. Table 2 reports the results for a cost of prevention 
approximately equal to 25 percent of steady-state annual income; this would be 
comparable to a one-time cost of prevention of around $90, in an economy in 
which annual income is about $1 per day.16  
What is the quantitative impact of the disease when costly but effective 
prevention measures are available? Table 2 shows the results of the experiment, 
comparing outcomes across the low and high steady states for a model economy 
in which q = 0.6. In this experiment, the economy in its low steady state has 
essentially the entire population protected from malaria, even though the 
protection is quite costly. People are willing to spend a large fraction of income to 
avoid getting sick.  
The disease is not entirely eradicated, however, and people cannot forego the 
costs of protection. Indeed, as long as some malaria is present, there are 
individuals who become infected as newborns before they are able to buy 
prophylaxis. Clearly this is rare, but it does imply that the steady state of this 
economy gives slightly lower welfare one in which the disease is actually 
                                                 
16 This is not far from the expected lifetime costs of a vaccine that has to be readministered at five-
year intervals, or from the total expected lifetime cost of insecticide-treated bednets, as calculated 
by Johnson (2007). 
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eradicated, where no one needs to bear the cost of the preventive good. Asset 
holdings, production, and consumption are all slightly lower than in the steady 
state with no malaria.  
This result – that malaria matters only little – is at first sight surprising, given 
that we have given the disease every chance to have a major impact. The cost of 
lifetime protection is substantial and must be paid in full up-front (i.e., there is no 
borrowing to finance prophylaxis); agents are born with no assets; and they must 
also hold capital for precautionary savings. The risks of infection are low, since 
others are generally healthy. Yet even so, individuals in this economy are still 
willing to pay for protection as soon as they can afford it, and they afford it 
rapidly.  
This seems to cast doubt on the potential for the disease to cause large macro 
effects in reality. Why would people in endemic areas not behave like individuals 
in the model? Even if the individual costs of the disease are modest, would it not 
pay for people to purchase bednets or screens or drugs to prevent or treat malaria 
for themselves or their children? Our model seems to indicate that the disease 
should have little macro impact where there are effective protective measures 
available, even if they are somewhat costly.  
 
Experiment 3: 
Consider now the effects of varying the cost of protection from malaria. How 
large does the cost need to be before it is viewed as effectively unaffordable or 
undesirable (as in Experiment 1)? Figure 2 graphs a discrete approximation of the 
relationship between protection costs and the steady-state levels of output, 
consumption, assets, and the proportion of people sick and protected. As the 
protection cost rises, steady-state output falls in a weakly monotonic fashion.  
A crude rule of thumb is that, for values of q less than one year’s average 
income, essentially everyone in the model economy purchases the preventive 
good and buys protection from the disease. For costs much higher than one year’s 
average income, some people opt not to purchase protection. Typically, these are 
individuals who have accumulated little capital and have had bad draws of the 
persistent idiosyncratic shock. For costs greater than twice the steady-state 
average income, essentially no one buys protection, including the “lucky rich.”  
As a result, the economy faces the full force of the disease. 
Thus, for malaria to have a big impact on income per capita, it must be true 
either that (a) there is not a truly effective bundle of preventive goods or actions; 
or (b) people are not aware of the effectiveness of the preventive goods; or (c) the 
cost of the preventive goods or actions is very high – in excess of one year’s 
annual income. The model suggests strongly that a moderate charge for bednets or 
spraying or drugs, if these prevention and control measures were truly effective, 
18. 
Gollin and Zimmermann Malaria 8/12/2007  
would not deter people from purchasing these goods, simply for their private 
benefits. 
Panel (d) of Figure 2 shows the proportions of people sick and protected as a 
function of the cost of q. Clearly the proportion sick rises as q increases, while the 
proportion buying protection falls (consistent with the law of demand).  
Are the results of Experiment 3 driven by specific parameter values? Figures 3 
and 4 demonstrate the robustness of the basic results to changes in the impact of 
the disease on the full range of parameters. It is striking that the qualitative results 
survive reasonably large changes in the parameter values. 
 
Experiment 4: 
Experiments 2 and 3 seem to raise a puzzle. Why is it that in actual malarial 
economies, relatively few people seem to use the protection measures that are 
available? In most countries, bednet use is very low, and the private demand for 
indoor residual spraying is even lower. In the model economy, by contrast, people 
seem willing to pay for preventive measures even when they are expensive. Why 
do individuals in malarial countries not take greater advantage of the available 
preventive goods? One hypothesis might be lack of information; another might be 
limited availability of the necessary items. But in most malarial countries, the 
basic preventive goods are widely available, and they are well understood, since 
government and non-governmental programs have been promoting their use for 
many years and, in some cases, even giving them away.  
In this experiment, we ask whether a possible explanation might arise from 
limited efficacy. Hitherto, we have assumed that an individual who buys the 
preventive bundle is fully protected for life. In reality, however, the available 
protective goods are far less than one hundred percent effective.  
Our model predicts that if the bundle of preventive goods is less than fully 
efficacious, there will be a dramatic reduction in the fraction of people purchasing 
protection. The intuition behind this result is simple enough; the only thing worse 
for people in the model than getting sick would be to get sick after buying the 
preventive good.  
Figure 5 shows the rapid drop-off in the fraction of people purchasing 
protection, for the cases where the protective bundle is less than fully effective. It 
is striking that even a relatively modest loss of efficacy would have large impacts 
on the economy. For example, at the benchmark level of prevention cost – of q 
equal to approximately one-fourth of annual income – a reduction from 100 
percent efficacy to 99 percent efficacy would have a very small but measurable 
impact on the fraction of the population purchasing protection. At a higher 
prevention cost of q equal to two years’ income, however, a reduction from 100 
percent efficacy to 99 percent efficacy would induce a decline of ten percentage 
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points in the fraction of people purchasing prevention. A decline to 95 percent 
efficacy would reduce by half the number of people purchasing protection. 
The effects on steady-state output would also be large. Figure 6 shows how 
steady-state output would be affected by decreases in the efficacy of the 
preventive good, holding all else constant. Again, at the benchmark prevention 
cost of one-fourth of annual income, a decline from perfect efficacy to 99 percent 
efficacy would reduce steady-state output by about seven percent. With q equal to 
two years’ income, a decline from perfect efficacy to 99 percent efficacy would 
lead to approximately a ten percent drop in steady-state output. With q = 2, a 
decline to 95 percent efficacy would reduce steady-state output by about one-
third. 
Although the model is clearly stylized, the analysis of efficacy has potentially 
important implications for policy. Where malaria prevention and control methods 
are less than fully effective – and the measures available today most probably 
have lower rates of effectiveness than the numbers analyzed here – it is to be 
expected that take-up rates will be very low, given any significant costs. Low 
take-up rates would be rational in this case, rather than reflecting ignorance or 
lack of information.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
These results point to several notable conclusions. First, it is entirely possible 
for an economy to arrive at a “malaria trap,” in which sickness begets poverty and 
poverty makes disease prevention unaffordable. In the model economy, we can 
quantify the magnitude of this “malaria trap.” It can reduce income per capita by 
about half. By point of comparison, Gallup and Sachs (2000) note that the 44 
countries with intensive malaria burdens in 1995 had per capita income of $1,526, 
compared with $8,268 for the 106 countries without intensive malaria burden. 
Our model suggests that the disease alone could account for just under half of this 
income gap. 
Economies in this situation could certainly benefit from being helped across 
the disease threshold into an alternate steady state in which the disease is 
essentially eradicated. The problem, of course, is that this intervention may be 
very expensive, in the model economy as well as in the real world. A related 
problem is that efficacious preventive measures may not exist. However, in the 
model economy, where prevention is available, people will be willing to pay 
considerable amounts for it – assuming efficacy.  
Where the costs of the disease are not large, however, a striking result of the 
model is that the private incentives are powerful enough that people will bear the 
cost of protection. For costs that are modest – as appears to be true in reality for 
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bednets and spraying, and as may eventually be true for a vaccine – people in the 
model economy purchase protection. Costs must be large, relative to average 
annual income, before they affect the take-up of the preventive good. However, if 
he preventive good is not fully effective, there will be powerful impacts on take-
up and on real outcomes.  
Another point worth noting here is that all of our analysis looks at private 
responses to malaria. But we know that decentralized outcomes in this economy 
are not optimal, because there are important infection externalities operating. 
Individuals in our model economy do not weigh in their decisions the potential 
impact of their actions on others. In particular, they are likely to under-invest in 
prevention relative to the social planner’s optimum. This suggests that there may 
be a significant role for the public sector to undertake campaigns of prevention 
and/or treatment.  
A few final points deserve reflection. First, utility comparisons across steady 
states in this model are complicated. Many more people are born and die in the 
steady states where people are poor and sick, and it is difficult to know what 
utility weight to assign to births and deaths. A simple comparison of income 
levels for the living is inadequate.  
In the same vein, it is important to note that the ultimate justification for 
investments in malaria control and treatment is the welfare cost, rather than the 
reduction in steady-state income per capita. Even if we found that the impacts on 
steady-state income were small, there are many other reasons why we should care 
about malaria and the enormous and tragic harm that it does. For hundreds of 
thousands of families, malaria is killing their infants and children. In many other 
families, the disease interferes with daily life, including schooling. Whether or not 
these effects are important for national income, they matter deeply to the 
individuals and communities that are affected. We do not need to justify malaria 
control programs on the grounds that they will contribute to GDP or to GDP 
growth. This must be one ingredient of our thinking, but the moral imperative 
alone is surely sufficient to justify some efforts for prevention, control and 
treatment.  
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Table 1: Experiment 1 Results (Multiple steady states with prohibitively 
expensive protection).  
q = 1000 
z = 0.7 
Low 
 
High 
 
   
Endogenously determined fertility rate
 
0.069 0.0150 
Proportion sick 
 
0.9007 0.0000 
Proportion protected from disease 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
Average assets 
 
2.9596 12.0797 
Average output 
 
1.3913 2.4521 
Average consumption 1.1565 2.2668 
 
 
Table 2: Experiment 2 Results (Multiple steady states with feasible but costly 
disease protection). 
q = 0.6 
z = 0.7 
Low High 
   
Endogenously determined fertility rate
 
0.015 0.0150 
Proportion sick 
 
0.0006 0.0000 
Proportion protected from disease 
 
0.9770 0.0000 
Average assets 
 
12.0631 12.0797 
Average output 
 
2.4488 2.4521 
Average consumption 2.2553 2.2668 
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Figure 1. Distributions of individual asset holdings in benchmark economy,
steady states with and without malaria.
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Figure 2: Benchmark economy, showing response of key variables 
to changes in the cost of protection from disease, in "sick" and "healthy" 
steady states. 
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(c) (d)
Prevention costs are measured relative to average income in the malaria-free economy.
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Figure 3: Robustness checks -- sensitivity of the model to changes in parameter values.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Prevention costs are measured relative to average income in the malaria-free economy.
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Figure 3: Robustness checks -- sensitivity of the model to changes in key parameter
values. 
Prevention costs are measured relative to average income in the malaria-free economy.
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Figure 5: Proportion of people who have purchased protection in steady-state,
for economies differing in the degree of efficacy of the preventive good. 
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Figure 6: Output per person relative to benchmark economy, 
for economies differing in the degree of efficacy of the preventive good.
100%
99%
97.5%
95%
90%
85%
80%
